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SEcTION VI.-SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT ALLOW
WRITS OF ERROR TO STATE COURTS IN CASES
SIMILAR TO GELPCKE v. DUBUQUE?
We have elsewhere incidentally referred to the anomalous
position assumed by the Supreme Court on this question. In
cases of this nature, where they acquire jurisdiction by reason
of the citizenship of the parties, they disregard the decisions
of state courts. They do this because the state court has
upheld an altered interpretation of a state statute, which
impairs the obligation of a contract. In'this class of cases
they hold such an interpretation to be a "law" within the
meaning of the federal clause. But if the case is brought up
by writ of error to a state court, the Supreme Court will
refuse to take jurisdiction, beause, they say, for purposes of
jurisdiction a state decision construing a statute is not a "law."
Thus, one who is so fortunate as to be a citizen of a state
other than the one where the cause of action arises may obtain
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relief; while an individual who is so unfortunate as to be a
citizen of the same state has no remedy. This condition of
affairs is little less than monstrous. The two positions are
absolutely irreconcilable. We shall discuss this subject under
three heads:
A. An examination of the cases similar to. Gelpcke v.
Dubuque which have come up by writ of error to state courts
and have been refused.
B. An examination of cases coming up by writ of error to
state courts where the act involves a contract.
C. The question of jurisdiction examined on principle.
A. An examination of the cases similar to Gelpcke v. Dubuque
which have come up by writ of error to state courts and have
been refused.
Ever since the date of the decision in Gelpcke v. Dubuque
cases from state courts involving similar facts have been con-
sistently applying to the Supreme Court for their consideration
and have been consistently refused. The two lines of cases
have grown up side by side. The only explanation which
-can be offered for this strange spectacle is that the court
recognized the justice of refusing to give a state court's
re-interpretation of a statute a retroactive effect, and at the
same time shrank from calling it a "law " in the technical
language of the judiciary acts. That this would have been
not only the more honest but also the more correct course,
would follow from the conclusions worked out in this paper.
The first case where the question was before the court was
Railroad v. Rock.' In that case the facts were identical with
Gelpcke v. Dubuque, except for the circumstance that here the
parties were citizens of the same state. The court dismissed
the writ because they declared that the case might bave been
decided on the ground of fraud, and that not only must it be
shtown that a federal question might have been involved, but it
must be shown that it necessarily was involved. This ground
was ample, and the court so considered it, for the dismissal of
14 Wall. 177 (1866), Miller, J.
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the writ.. What follows cannot have the full force of a de-
cision, but must partake of the nature of a dictum.
The court, however, then went on to say: "'That counsel
had based their whole claim on the ground that 'the Supreme
Court of Iowa had made a decision impairing the obligition
of a contract,' and had based their entire argument on the
fundamental error that this court can as an appellate tribunal
reverse the decision of a state court, because that court may
hold a contract to be void which this court might hold to be
valid." It is submitted that if counsel did base their whole
claim on that broad assumption, they deservedly and unques-
tionably failed to make out a case for the consideration of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
The argument of counsel is very briefly reported, so we can
hardly tell whether or not they distinguished between state
decisions which interpret state statutes, and state decisions
which merely interpret contracts. Mr. Justice Miller, who
delivered the opinion, made no distinction, and evidently con-
sidered only state decisions in their broad sense. Viewed in
this light, the statement of Mr. Justice Miller is unquestionable.
He says that the court would refuse to assume jurisdiction,
because "If this were the law, every case of a contract held
by the state court not to be binding, for any cause whatever,
would be brought to this court for review, and we should thus
become the court of final resort in all cases of contract where
the decisions of the state courts were against the validity of
the contracts set up in those courts."
No one would question Mr. Justice Miller's argument if his
premises were sound. He assumes that the Supreme Court
were asked to review the state court's construction of a con-
tract. It is submitted that this is incorrect. It was not the
construction of the contract, but the interpretation of the statute,
that impaired its obligation. The Supreme Court were asked
to review the decision which upheld and applied that altered
interpretation.
Railroad v. Rock first laid down the rule that the Supreme
Court would not in such cases assume jurisdiction. The part
of the opinion devoted to the question we are discussing, which
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was only a few lines in extent, was not necessary for the de-
cision, and yet this case undoubtedly is the foundation of all
the., other decisions which follow it in- adopting the same
course.
As these cases are all very similar in their facts, an extended
investigation would be of no service. We shall quote, how-
ever, from one of the later cases to show the development of
the doctrine, and cite some of the intervening cases in the
note.' In Bacon v. Texas, Mr. justice Peckham for the court
says: "The argument involves the claim that jurisdiction
exists in this court to review the judgment of a state court on
writ of error when such jurisdiction is based upon an alleged
impairment of a contract, by reason of the alteration by a
state court of a construction heretofore given by it to such
contract, or to a particular statute, or series of statutes, in
existence when the contract* was entered into. Such a foun-
dation for our jurisdiction does not exist. It has been held
that where a state court has decided, in a series of decisions,
that its legislature had the power to permit municipalities to
issue bonds to pay their subscriptions to railroad companies,
and such had been issued accordingly, if in such event suit
were brought on the bonds in a United States court, that court
would not follow the decision of the state court rendered after
the issue of the bonds, and holding that the legislature has no
power to permit the municipality to issue them, and that they
were therefore void. Such are the cases of GedPcke v. Dubuque
and Douglas v. Co. of Pike. In cases of that nature there is
room for the principle laid down that the construction of a
statute and admission as to its validity, made by the highest
court of a state, prior to the issuing of any obligations based
upon the statute, enters into and forms a part of the contract,
and will be given effect to by this court, as against a subse-
Sp.. R. v. McClure, xo Wall. 51i (1870), Swayne, J.; Bank v. Bank, 14
Wall. 9 (187r), Swayne, J.; Palmer v. Marston, 14 Wall. xo (1871),
Swayne, J. ; Kennebec River v. R. R., z4 Wall. 23 (1871), Miller, J. ;
Dugger v. Bocock. 1o4 U. S. 596 (i88r), Waite, C. .; Lehigh Water Co.
v. 1_aston, 121 U. S. 388 (1886). Harlan, J. ; N. 0. Water Works P. La.
Sugar Ref. Works, 125 U. S. 19 (1887); Central Land Co. v. Laidley, x59
IU. S. 102 (0895), Gray, J.
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•quent changing of decision by the State court, by which such
legislation might be held to be invalid. But effect is given to
it by this court, only on appeal from a judgment of a United
States court and not from that of a state court. This court
has no jurisdiction to review a judgment of a state court made
under precisely the same circumstances, althoqgh such state
court thereby decided that the state legislation was .void, which
it had prior thereto held to be valid. It has no jurisdiction,
because of the absence of any legislation subsequent to the
issuance of the bonds, which had been given effect to by the
state court. In other words, we have no jurisdiction because
a state court changes its views in regard to the. proper con-
struction of its state statutes, although the effect of such
judgment may be to impair the value of what the state court
had before that held to be a valid contract." 1
This opinion -is quoted somewhat at length that we may
have before us the reason why a writ of error is not allowed,
and that we may perceive the distinction between this case and
the line to which Mr. Justice Peckham referred as represented
by Gelpcke v. Dubuque and Douglas v. Co. of Pike. We do not
derive much satisfaction from a perusal of his language, and
yet this is the latest exposition of the subject.
The reason given why the court does not take jurisdiction
is because there has been no subsequent statute passed im-
pairing the obligation of contracts, 'and which the state court
has upheld, which is declared to be a condition precedent to
bringing up a case under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act.
The court does not attempt to distinguish the cases coming up
from Circuit Courts. Mr. Justice Peckham evidently realized
that they cannot be distinguished.. He contents himself by
stating that in the one case the court will overthrow the
authority of the state court, and in the other case they will
not assume jurisdiction.
After this glance at the cases we come back again to our
starting point. As late as January 9th, in the current year,
the federal court reasserted the doctrine that a state court's
1 x63 U. S. 207 (1895), Peckham, J.
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interpretation of a statute is a "law" within the meaning of
the federal clause forbidding states to pass laws impairing the
obligation of contracts; and that they refuse to apply it for
that reason.' But in the latest case which we have examined
on the other side, we find it just as positively stated that such
interpretation is not a "law" within the meaning of the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act. This is the situation, not entirely
satisfying, which we find in that field.
B. An examination of cases coming up by writ of error to
state courts where the act involves a contract.
As this class of cases has already been discussed in a former
section, we shall not re-examine the early cases at this point.
We wish, however, to ask careful attention to the very recent
case of McCullough v. Commonwealth of Va? ,The famous
coupon cases of Virginia are well known, and alsc the frequent
attempts of Virginia to limit her liability by legislative, enact-
ments. The original coupon act was passed on March 30,
1871, and provided for the issuance of coupon bonds, which
were declared to be receivable in payment of taxes due the
state. This act was uniformly held by the Supreme Court of
Virginia to be a constitutional and valid act during a period of
twenty-seven years. Finally, the Supreme Court of V'rginia
adjudged the act to be null and void, and the case, in vhich
this action was taken, was then brought into the Supreme
Court by writ of error.
The judgment of the lower court was entirely directed to an
investigation of the original act. Nothing else was ever men-
tioned. Mr. Justice Peckham, in his dissenting opinion,
observes, "The opinion of the state court shows that the
judgment went upon the original and inherent invalidity of the
coupon statutes, and its judgment in that respect, as I shall
hereafter attempt to show, gave no effect to any subsequent
legislation."
The question was then squarely before the court. Is a
decision adjudging an act void which, during a long period of
1 Loeb v. Trustees of Ham. Co., 9 r Fed. 37 (1899), Thompson, J.
2 172 U. S. 102 (1898), Brewer, J.
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years, the same court had held valid, a "law" impairing the
obligation of contracts; or, in other words, had the court
authority to review?
This is a peculiarly strong case. Mr. Justice Brewer ob-
serves: "Now, at the end of twenty-seven years from the
passage of the act, we are asked to hold that this guarantee of
value, so fortified as it has been, was never of any validity,
that the decisions to that effect are of no force, and that all
the transactions which have been had, based thereon, rested
on nothing. Such a result is so startling that it, at least,
compels more than ordinary consideration." These consid-
erations were so powerful as almost to overthrow the court's
hesitancy to call a spade a spade and admit that this decision
was a "1 law."
The court did assurie jurisdiction, but not upon the ground
we have indicated. Instead, it cast about for an excuse to
take cognizance of the case, and finally hit upon the expedient
of saying that, while the decision did not refer to the later acts,
yet its effect was to uphold them by removing the only consti-
tutional bar to their validity; i. e., vested rights acquired under
the act of '71.
This reasoning is, indeed, most attenuated, and Mr. Justice
Peckham, dissenting, effectually shatters it. He says: "The
state court has held the coupon acts to be entirely void, be-
cause in violation of the state constitution in existence when
they were passed. . . . This judgment did not give the
slightest effect to the legislation subsequent to the coupon
statutes. It simply held there were no coupon statutes be-
cause those which purported to be such were totally void.
No subsequent statute was necessary, and none such was
given effect to. Striking down the coupon statutes effectually
destroyed any assumed right to pay taxes in coupons, and the
subsequent legislation was needless and ineffectual."
This language is quoted, not because we concur in Mr.
Justice Peckham's dissent, for we do not, but to show how
completely the court failed to justify its assumption of juris-
diction on this ground.
We submit that the case was correctly decided, but that
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though not directly asserted, the real ground of taking juris-
diction was because the State of Virginia was attempting to,
impair the obligation of contracts by judicial legislation.
If this be not admitted then we must concur with Mr. Justice-
Peckham that the court had no jurisdiction.
This case plainly indicates that the Supreme Court, realizing
that judicial interpretation does have all the force of law, and-
thai a change of construction does impair the obligation of con-
tracts just as effectually as positive statutes, are eagerly catching
at every theory, no matter how shadowy, to give them juris-
diction.
We hope the time is not far distant when they will cease-
offering apologetic theories for assuming the jurisdiction which-
is theirs by right.
C. The question ofjuridiction examined on princile.
In view of the conclusions worked out in the preceding,
sections of this paper, it was really unnecessary to discuss the
action of the court under A and B, but we do so to show how
grave is the situation before us, and that the court are already-
nearing the point where they are ready to accept the full.
theory of judicial legislation.
We cannot better -illustrate the theory that the court have
power to assume jurisdiction than by making use of the facts
involved in Railroad v. Rock, which, it will be remembered, are-
similar to GelOcke v. Dubuque, except in that the parties were-
both citizens of Iowa.
We will take Mr. Justice Miller at his word, and assume-
that no cases can be brought into the Supreme Court by writ-
of error under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act, unless the.
judgment of the state court has upheld a law passed subse-
quently to the making of the contract. As to the meaning oft
law, we quote from Mr. Justice Field's opinion in Williams v.
Bruffy: ' "Any enactment, from whatever source originating,
to which a state gives the force of law, is a statute of the state.
within the meaning of the clause cited relating to the jurisdic-
tion of the court."
196 U. S. r76 (877), Field, J.
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The Iowa Supreme Court, in Railroad v. Rock, decided two
separate and distinct points:
(i) That the legislative act was invalid.
(2) That that interpretation should be applied to the contract
before it.
The first point the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to
review. It could no more interfere with it than it could
have repealed a repealing act overturning the same law. .But
what about the second point ? Here the state court applied
an interpretation of a statute to a contract so as to impair its
obligation. "That interpretation of a statute," as we have
shown, is really an act of a legislative character. That part
of the decision, which was purely judicial, upheld this " inter-
pretation." It therefore upheld a "law." The fact that the
same case involved both points makes the principle more diffi-
cult to see, but not less sound.
That a decision may involve both functions is not unfounded
in authority. In the English case of Winthrop v. Lechmere a
colonial act of Connecticut was declared void (because it was
adjudged to be in conflict with the English law) by an order
in council. The decision also involved a review of four
judicial sentences, and one judicial order of the Superior
Court of Connecticut. Mr. Brinton Coxe says: "In the
writer's opinion, the order in council determining the appeal
of Winthrop v. Lechmere was actually of a mixed nature. He
deems it partly judicial and partly legislative. It was no mere
judicial judgment. That part of it was judicial which reversed
and set aside the four sentences and declared the order of the
court to be null and void. That part of it was legislative
which declared the two acts of the colonial legislature to be
null and void. The writer understands this view to be sup-
ported by authority. In an order in council dated April io,
1730, the order in council determining -Winthrop v. Lechmere
is referred to. The action therein taken concerning the Con-
necticut act for settling intestates' estates, is expressly called
a repeal of that act.''
I See Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, p. 212.
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This is precisely the position which we now assume. That
part of the Iowa decision which declarel the act null and void
was -legislative; it may be referred to in the language above
cited, as a "repeal of the ac:." That part of the Iowa de-
cision which upheld that "repeal" and so applied it as to
impair the obligation of the contract before it, was judicial.
It was, therefore, a judicial decision by the Supreme Court of
the state, upholding and applying a "law" which impaired
the obligation of the contract, and it should have been re-
viewed on writ of error by the Supreme Court of the United
States.
The objection that this would throw open the door to a vast
multitude of new cases, even if it were a legitimate objection,
is not true. Mr. Justice Miller says that to allow writs of error
in such cases would be "to permit an appeal to be taken every
time a state court adjudged a contract to be void which we
might think to be valid." It is submitted that this reasoning
cannot be supported. It springs from the same fundamental
error of assuming that it was the construction of the contract, and
not the interpretation of the act which impaired its obligation.
We submit that, if a principle be correct, it should be made
a rule of action, even though additional cases will thereby be
admitted to the courts, and that the vast horde of contracts,
adjudged void, which Mr. Justice Miller saw, in his imagina-
tion, ready to swarm into the Supreme Court as soon as they
opened the door to cases like Railroad v. Rock, had no exist-
ence elsewhere. Cases like Railroad v. Rock would in all
probability be less numerous than those like Gelpcke v.
Dubuque.
Mr. Justice Miller further declares that there could be here
no impairment, because the state court by its construction of
its own statute, which was conclusive, had decided that no
contract ever existed. This is arguing in a circle. It assumes
in the first place that a state decision altering its former inter-
pretation and declaring a statute void, makes it void ab initio,
which is the very point at issue, and, in the second place, it
again confuses the two separate and distinct things, the inter-
pretation of the act and the construction of the contract.
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It is said further that the federal clause is aimed at the
legislative acts of the states and not at the decisions of its
courts. This is of course true in theory. Butthis theory is
not contradicted because, as we have shown, the decisions in
the cases we are discussing are "legislative acts" in their
intrinsic nature.
It is also declared that to allow writs of error w ould be to
permit the Supreme Court to interfere with the state court's
construction of state statutes. As we have already pointed
out, in no sense would this be true. The federal clause, while
theoretically aimed at the fundamental power of the state to
make the law, really operates by preventing the -application of
forbidden laws by the state courts. As the Supreme- Court
cannot get out a writ of injunction to prevent, a state from
passing a law impairing the obligation of contracts, nor repeal
it when it has been passed, so they cannot prevent nor change
the state court's construction of its laws. In both cases the
power of the court is simply preventive. .
They say to the state legislature, "Pass what laws you
please, we have no power to prevent you, but if your courts
so apply a law as to impair the obligation of a contract in ir
tarticular case, then we shall step in and protect that contract."
In most cases this practically nullifies the law, but in any case
the court do not go beyond the rights which they are protect-
ing. The law may impair the obligation of the contract before
them, and yet be valid as to other contracts. In such a case
the court content themselves with neutralizing its effect in the
case before them.'
So, in the same manner, the Supreme Court, aaldressing
themselves to the state court, say: " Interpret your laws as
you see fit. We have -no power to prevent you. But if you
so apply an interpretation as to impair the obligation of a con-
tract, then we will protect that contract."
To both the court say: "Whatever you may or may not
do, here is one field into which you may not enter. We
stand here by virtue of the duty and privilege laid upon us by
1 Sturgs v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (1879), MarshalU, C.J.
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the Constitution of the Union to prevent it, and we shall pre-
vent it. But we have no intention of interfering with you in
those fields where we admit you to be supreme."
The fear that the liberty of the state court to interpret its
own laws will be taken away is thus seen to be unfounded.
The power to do that does not exist. It is only the purely
judicial action in applging either the statute or the interpreta-
tion of that statute which can be reviewed by the Supreme
Court.
After all, the objection most often urged to permitting writs
of error in this class of cases is a technical one. It is said
that the judiciary act provides that a subsequent law must be
upheld before the writ can be allowed. We believe that up-
holding an authoritative interpretation of a statute is upholding
a "law." But if we are to be hindered by a procedural diffi-
culty, when we are resting upon our constitutional rights, the
difficulty should be obviated by altering the language of
the act.
Although sometimes said, with fine irony, to be quite un-
usual in the law, it may not be amiss to survey this question,
for a moment, from the standpoint of common sense.
Every one can see that to permit a court to unsettle rights,
,acquired during a long period of years, upon the faith of a
law, sanctioned by every department of government, ought not
to be allowed. Every business man knows that a system
which makes it impossible for one ever to be sure what the
statute law is, is most dangerous to the welfare of the commu-
nity. It does not require one learned in the law to see that
the decisions in Gelpcke v. Dubuque and kindred cases are
pre-eminently just
This may not be an argument, but, as practical men, we
know that the law exists for the purpose of doing justice, and
-this fact should cause us to think twice before rejecting a
theory which admittedly has always been just in its applica-
tion, and before we refuse to apply that principle to a class of
suitors equally as deserving as those to whom relief is granted.
Moreover, the full significance of the action of the court in
refusing to assume jurisdiction. has never yet been fully real-
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ized. If a state can, by judicial legislation, pass laws impairing
the obligation of contracts, it can also, in the same manner,
enact expostfacto laws. Suppose, to take an extreme case,
the offence of horse stealing at common law is punishable wita
death. Suppose a state passes a law reducing the punishment
to fine and short imprisonment. Suppose, for a long period of
years, this act is enforced by the courts and is uniformly held
to be constitutional. The court then reverses its ruling and
declares the act null and void. If Mr. Justice Miller's reason-
ing be correct, all those individuals who have stolen horses in
the meantime can be condemned to death. It is no answer to
say that the state would probably not take such action. If the
principle be sound it must be correct in all possible situations.
We submit that if a state should attempt, by judicial action, to
thus in effect enact an expostfacto law, the Supreme Court
would speedily forget their procedural scruples and would
assume jurisdiction.
As lawyers, we know that judicial legislation is a fact with
which we have to deal. We know that the states can and
often do impair the obligation of contracts with impunity by
means of legislative-judicial action. We see also a constantly
increasing tendency on the part of the state courts to consti-
tute themselves not only the judges of the constitutionait of
legislative acts, but even judges of whether a law be not, in
their opinion, improper, as appears from the opinion of a judge
who arrogates to himself the right to overturn a law,' because
it "is a species of sumptuary legislation which has been uni-
versally condemned as an attempt to degrade the intelligence,
virtue and manhood of the American laborer and foist upon
the people a paternal government of the most objectionable
character, because it assumes that the employer is a knave
and the laborer an imbecile." This is judicial legislation, what-
ever may be thought of the principle. It should, in all cases,
be recognized as such, and its effect defined and restrained,
not given the unlimited extent of purely judicial decisions.
Thomas Raeburn White.
I State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 8o2 (x889).
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